Symposium

• Fleck, Dieter

Abstract

Security Council measures against Iraq were hardly indicative of new developments in the law of arms control and disarmament. However, Iraqi threats to use chemical weapons have encouraged consensus among participating states to conclude the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and revelations of the advanced nature of Iraq's nuclear programmes might have contributed to the May 1995 decision of states parties to the 1972 Non‐Proliferation Treaty to extend the treaty indefinitely. The system of ongoing monitoring and verification introduced under Security Council Resolutions 687 (1991) and 1284 (1999), as well as the practical experience gained through monitoring nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles have supported efforts to strengthen international verification activities. As a further result of the conflict, increased awareness of the dangers of exporting dual‐purpose technologies has led to a review of guidelines and practices for inspections under IAEA safeguards agreements. The problem of enforced verification, however, remains unresolved. This underlines that there is no viable alternative to resolute action by the Security Council. It likewise supports the conclusion that the need for political solutions in post‐conflict peace‐building, involving and stimulating the participation and cooperation of the state concerned, is even more obvious today than it was a decade ago.